died in those lands. He was my great grandfather. Today, when so many foreigners come to Germany looking for the same things, by contrast, they are repudiated, expelled, treated. ..like Turks! Germany has forgotten the hospitality that was extended to its poor by other countries in the nineteenth century.
I have said that the concept of modernity occludes the role of Europe's own Iberian periphery, and in particular Spain, in its formation. At the end of the fifteenth century, Spain was the only European power with the capacity of external territorial conquest, as it demonstrated in the conquest of the Kingdom of Granada from Islamic rule in 1492, the last phase in the centuries-long "reconquest" and colonization of Andalusia. Until that moment, Europe had been itself the periphery of a more powerful and "developed" Islamic world (just as, until Columbus, the Atlantic was a secondary ocean). The Iberian Reconquest, with the extreme sectarian violence it unleashed in its final stages (broken treaties, elimination of local elites, endless massacres and tortures, the demand that the conquered betray their religion and culture under pain of death or expulsion, the confiscation and repartition in feudal form of lands, towns, and their inhabitants to the officers of the conquering army), was, in turn, the model for the colonization of the New World.
Understanding this, I believe, allows Latin America to also rediscover its "place" in the history of modernity. We were the first periphery of modern Europe; that is, we suffered globally from our moment of origin on a constitutive process of modernization (although the term as such wouldn't have been in use at the time) that afterward would be applied in Africa and Asia. Although our continent was already known to Europe-as the 1489 world map of Henricus Martellus in Rome demonstrates-only Spain, thanks to the political ability of the Catholic kings and the daring of Columbus, attempted formally and openly, with the corresponding assumption of rights and privileges (and in open competition with Portugal), to launch itself toward the Atlantic in search of a route to India. This process of discovery and conquest, whose quincentennary is commemorated this year, is not simply of anecdotal or historical interest: It is part of the process of the constitution of modern subjectivity itself.
The myth of origin that is hidden in the emancipatory "concept" of modernity, and that continues to underlie philosophical reflection and many other theoretical positions in European and North American thought, has to do above all with the connection of Eurocentrism with the concomitant "fallacy of developmentalism." The fallacy of developmentalism consists in thinking that the path of Europe's modern development must be followed unilaterally by every other culture. Development is taken here as an ontological, and not simply a sociological or economic, category. It is the "necessary movement" of Being for Hegel, its inevitable "development." 2 Kant's answer to the question posed by the title of his essay "What is Enlightenment?" is now more than two centuries old. "Enlightenment is the exodus of humanity by its own effort from the state of guilty immaturity," he wrote. "Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why the greater part of humanity remains pleasurably in this state of immaturity." For Kant, immaturity, or adolescence, is a culpable state, laziness and cowardice its existential ethos: the unmündig. Today, we would ask him: An African in Africa or as a slave in the United States in the eighteenth century; an Indian in Mexico or a Latin American mestizo: Should all of these subjects be considered to reside in a state of guilty immaturity? Hegel answered this question in the following way. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he showed how World History is the selfrealization of God (a theodicy), Reason, and Freedom. It is the process toward enlightenment:
Universal History represents. ..the development of the consciousness that the Spirit has of its freedom and also the evolution of the understanding that the Spirit obtains through such consciousness. This development implies a series of stages, a series of determinations of freedom, which are born from its self-concept, that is, from the nature of freedom to become conscious of itself. ...This necessity and the necessary series of the pure abstract determinations of the concept are the province of Logic. velopment is dialectically linear: It is a primordially ontological category, particularly in the case of World History. It has, moreover, a direction in space: "The movement of Universal History goes from the East to the West. Europe is the absolute end of Universal History. Asia is its beginning" (Lectures, 243). This idea of a "necessary" movement of history from East to West, one can readily appreciate, must first have had to eliminate Latin America and Africa from the movement of World History, situating them like Asia in a state of "immaturity" or "childhood" (Kindheit). In effect,
The world is divided into the Old World and the New World. The name of the New World comes from the fact that America. ..has only recently come to be known by Europeans. But it should not be thought for that reason that the distinction is purely external. It is essential. This world is new not only relatively but also absolutely; it is so in all of its aspects, physical and political. ...The sea of islands that extends between Latin America and Asia reveals also a certain immaturity with respect to its origin. ...No less so New Holland offers the characteristics of a young geography, for if, departing from the English colonies, we enter into its territory we discover enormous rivers that have not yet found their course. ...We have evidence of the development of America and its level of civilization, especially in Mexico and Peru, but as an entirely particular culture, which expires the moment in which the Absolute Spirit approaches it. ...The inferiority of these individuals in all respects is manifest. (Lectures, (199) (200) This "immaturity" (Unreife) is total, physical (even the vegetation and animals are more primitive, brutal, monstrous, or simply weaker or degenerate). It is the sign of (Latin) America. 4 Hegel writes:
In respect to the elements that compose it, America has not yet completed its formation. ...America is, consequently, the land of the future. Only in future ages will its historical importance become evident. ...But as a land of the future Latin America has no interest for us, because the philosopher does not make prophesies. (Lectures, 209-10)
As a land in childhood, then, Latin America remains outside World History.
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The same happens with Africa. Hegel still shares the medieval, premodern conception of the world as a trinity composed of Europe, Asia, and Africa, but it is a trinity in which the axis of history has been displaced toward Europe. Thus:
The three parts of the world maintain between themselves, therefore, an essential relation and constitute a totality (Totalität). ...
[But] The Mediterranean sea is the element of union between them, and this converts it into the center of all Universal History… The Mediterranean is the axis of Universal History. (Lectures, 210)
Hegel has a number of pages on Africa that deserve to be read, although one needs to approach the task with a sense of humor, since they are a kind of fantastic apotheosis of racist ideology, full of superficial prejudices and received opinions and a seemingly infinite sense of superiority that illustrate well the European state of mind at the beginning of the nineteenth century. European racial pride-the Hegelian "immoderateness" Kierkegaard was so fond of ironizing-is nowhere more evident than in these remarks. As "South," both Latin America and Africa lie outside the East-West movement of World History. But Hegel also consigns Asia to a preparatory, introductory role:
Asia is the part of the world where one can verify origin as such… But Europe is absolutely the Center and the End (das Zentrum und das Ende) of the ancient world and of the West as such, Asia the absolute East. (Lectures, 235) Asia is the Spirit only in its infancy. Oriental despotism allows only The One (the emperor) to be free. It is thus the dawn, but in no sense the culmination of World History. The "beginning" and "end" of History is Europe. 6 But there are various Europes. There is Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, southern France, and Italy. There the Spirit dwelt in antiquity, when the North was still "uncultivated" (unkultiviert). But Southern Europe "is not marked with a nucleus (Kern) of development in itself" (Lectures, 240); destiny is to be found, rather, in Northern Europe. (With this, Hegel discards, in a fashion followed by most contemporary European and North American thinkers, as I suggested earlier, the importance of Spain and Portugal in the period between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries-that is, the age of mercantilism-in the development of modernity.)
But there are also two distinct Northern Europes. One is Eastern Europe, consisting of Poland and Russia, which have always existed in relation to Asia. The one that needs to be spoken of, however, is Western Europe: "Germany, France, Denmark, the Scandinavian countries are the heart of Europe" (Lectures, 240). In relation to this idea, Hegel's writing takes on something of the sonority of Wagner's trumpets:
The Germanic Spirit is the Spirit of the New World (neuen Welt), its end is the realization of absolute truth, as the infinite self-6. Francis Fukuyama's much discussed thesis -in the essay "The End of History," The National Interest (Summer 1989)-derives directly from this remark of Hegel's. Fukuyama maintains, to be precise, that the United States and the capitalist free market are, with the collapse of communism in the "North" after 1989, the only possible model of society and polity, with no other alternative, and thus are the "end" of history.
determination of freedom, which has as its content its own absolute form. The principle of the German Empire must be adjusted to the Christian religion. The destiny of the Germanic peoples is to provide the missionaries of the Christian Principle. 7 Expressing a thesis that is the exact contrary of the one I want to develop in these lectures, Hegel continues:
There arises via the reestablishment of Christian freedom the consciousness of the self-justification of the Spirit. The Christian principle has passed through the formidable discipline of culture; the Reformation gives it its exterior dimension with the discovery of America. ...The principle of the free Spirit makes itself here the banner of the whole world, and from it develop the universal principles of reason. ...Custom and tradition no longer have validity; the different forms of right need to legitimize themselves as founded on rational principles. Thus is the Spirit's freedom realized. (Werke, 12:413-14; my italics) For Hegel, in other words, modern Christian Europe has nothing to learn from other worlds, other cultures. It has its principle in itself and is, at the same time, the full "realization" of that principle: "The principle has been achieved, and because of this the Last Days have arrived: the idea of Christianity has achieved its full realization" (Werke, 12:414).
The three stages of the "Germanic world" are the "development" of this same Spirit. They are the kingdoms of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The Germanic Empire is "the kingdom of the Totality, in which we see a repetition of past ages" (Werke, 12:417). These are the First Age, the migrations of the Germanic tribes in the times of the Roman Empire, and the Second Age, the feudal Middle Ages. This Second Age comes to an end with three events: the Renaissance, the discovery of America, and the discovery of the passage to India via Cape Horn. These events signal the end of the terrible night of the Middle Ages, but they do not constitute in themselves the new, or Third, Age. This Age, the age of modernity, begins with a properly German event: the Lutheran Reformation, whose principle is, in turn, "developed" fully in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.
This embodiment of World History in Europe endows Europe with a kind of universal right, as Hegel explains in a passage from his Encyclopedia:
History is the configuration of the Spirit in the form of becoming…. The people that receives such an element as a natural principle… is the dominant people at this moment of World History… Against the absolute right that such a people possesses by virtue of being the bearer of the development of the world Spirit, the spirit of other peoples has no rights (rechtlos).
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This people, the North, Europe (and, for Hegel, Germany and England in particular), has, in other words, an "absolute right" because it is the "bearer" (Träger) of the Spirit in its "moment of development" (Entwicklungstuffe). In the face of this, no other people can be said to have any rights proper to it, and certainly none that it could pose against Europe. This is one of the clearest definitions not only of Eurocentrism but of the sacralization of the imperial power of the North or the Center over the South, the Periphery, the colonial and dependent world of antiquity. Further commentary is unnecessary. The texts speak in their frightening cruelty of a limitless cynicism that masks itself as the "development" of "reason" itself, Aufklärung.
In addition-and this is something that has passed unnoticed by many commentators and critics of Hegel, including Marx-it is worth noting that for Hegel, the contradictory character of European "civil society" is transcended in the "state" in part thanks to the constitution of "colonies":
Through a dialectical impulse to transcend itself that is proper to it, such a society is, in the first place, driven to seek outside itself new consumers. For this reason it seeks to find ways to move about among other peoples that are inferior to it with respect to the resources that it has in abundance, or, in general, its industry ... This development of relations offers also the means of colonization towards which, in either an accidental or systematic way, a completed civil society is impelled. Colonization allows a portion of its duced in Europe at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. If Latin America is excluded as such from World History, then North, or Anglo-Saxon, America is the West at a second level for Hegel, and thus has a place in World History. population to return to the principle of family property in the new territory, and, at the same time, it acquires for itself a new possibility and field of labor. 10 Europe thus "occupies" foreign lands. Hegel does not seem to realize that this means they must be seized from other peoples. The periphery of Europe is a "free space" that allows the poor, produced by the contradictions of capitalist development, to become capitalists or property owners themselves in the colonies. 11 Habermas is still essentially in this Hegelian mode when he writes that "the historical events that are decisive for the implantation of the principle of [modern] subjectivity are the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution." 12 For Habermas, as for Hegel, the discovery of America is not a constitutive fact of modernity. 13 Habermas also follows Hegel's example in discounting the role of Spain in the origins of modernity.
14 My intention in these lectures is to give an account of modernity that shows the contrary: that the experience not only of "discovery" but especially of "conquest" is essential in the constitution of the modern ego, not only as subjectivity per se but as a subjectivity that is the "center" and "end" of history. Latin America is thus the "other-face" (teixtli, in Aztec), the essential alterity of modernity. The immature European ego, or subject, in the Middle Ages itself peripheral to and dependent on the Islamic world, "develops" until it arrives, with Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico (the first extra-European space in which it can carry out a prototypic "development"), at the point of becoming the "master-of-the-world"-a Will to Power specific to its self-consciousness. This sense of the relation between the conquest
